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We have the consequence of this approach before our eyes. While the financial crisis is still far away from a
convincing solution, poverty is growing in many countries, betraying the original promise that the European
integration would make societies more homogeneous and each of them more wealthy and just. The response to this
disappointing state of affairs has been a strong revival of nationalism, first within the political debate, and then also
among intellectuals and scholars in many fields, from political science to economy, and from law to humanities.
Curiously, the tendency to renationalization is based on an unprecedented and surprising alliance between
intellectuals and political groups which were generally rather distant from one another. First, we have leftists who
seems to believe that going back to national sovereignty would automatically guarantee more justice, as if the
problems would stop at the national borders. Secondly, former supporters of European technocracy join
unexpectedly in, who, after having defended for long time the specific supranational output-legitimacy, suddenly
discover that input-legitimacy is irreplaceable, whereas the only element which is never taken seriously into account
is the possibility of a supranational democracy. The only component of the new renationalization movement which
always remained consistent with itself is that of the hardcore advocates of the limits of integration.
Against this background, von Bogdandy’s and Ioannidis’ proposal stands out, due to its originality and courage. In
particular, it keeps a healthy distance from the idea that European integration should be made more
intergovernmental while maintaining strong connections between the renationalized member states. This solution is
inevitably doomed to be interpreted by people affected by measures as a kind of unduly interference from outside,
or even as a form of mild foreign occupation. To the contrary, von Bogdandy and Ioannidis call for an action which is
explicitly supranational, thus safeguarding the most specific and precious dimension of European integration. Surely,
many obstacles lie on the way of the realization of the proposal. First, we may wonder how the idea is to be
concretely implemented. Yet, it is not on this point that I would like to focus the attention, but on the question of its
legitimacy. Indeed, the proposal to link the support to the solution of domestic problems to the intervention of experts
from outside reminds us of a praxis which was quite usual in the Italian “communes” between the late Middle Ages
and the early Modern Ages. There, when a community seemed to be incapable of resolving internal problems, a
foreign personality endowed with the necessary competences – the “podestà straniero” – was appointed with the
specific purpose to put an end to the domestic quarrels and inefficiency. However, we are now far away from the
time of the Italian “communes” and our idea of democracy is far more demanding. Therefore, a cautious approach is
almost inevitable.
Von Bogdandy and Ioannidis’ implicit suggestion that the question of legitimacy could be bypassed through the
circumstance that the experts appointed to guarantee the rationalization of Greek institutions – insofar as the
domestic authorities seem not to be able to implement it – should come from the Greek diaspora is not really
convincing. In fact, the “traitors from inside” is generally subject to no less hatred than the “foreign occupiers” –
sometimes they are met with even more rejection. Yet, there is an even more essential element: The common
national belonging would be understood just as a pretest to cover what is – and has to be in the most fundamental
meaning of the proposal – an intervention from outside. The experts may be Greeks, but they would have the
authority and the resources to act only on the basis of a legitimacy, which cannot arise only from Greek society and
establishment. If it would be so, we would not need any action. But which legitimacy, now, we can resort to? I think
that the answer could be found in an approach which would mark, at the same time, a step forwards in the European
integration. In fact, some countries – not just Greece, indeed – need help, and this resources cannot but come from
the rest of the Union. However, they cannot – and should not – come without conditions. But these conditions should
be determined in the name of all European citizens. In other words, Greek citizens would get support as European
citizens from all other European citizens . Furthermore, if measures should be imposed, this should happen – and be
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uncompromisingly understood – as an action accomplished by European citizens towards other European citizens,
therefore also by Greek citizens towards themselves. The step forward would consists in a revitalization of the
supranational institutions of EU and, lastly, in a revival of the federal idea of the European integration, after one and
a half decades of unsuccessful intergovernmentalism.
Put this way, the solution seems to have an exceedingly formal touch. But it is not so. In fact, it has to be
accompanied by a significant increase of sensibility towards the destiny of those social groups which are carrying
the most heavy burden of the crisis. This means that solidarity has to be rediscovered at the European level. Only if 
measures that supranational authorities impose to domestic constituencies can be understood as expression of a
sincere – even if surely not unconditioned – solidarity, they will be accepted as self-imposed “homework” in order to
guarantee a better future to all fellow citizens, national as well as supranational.
Concluding, how could von Bogdandy’s and Ioannidis’ proposal be complemented or, to some extent, even
corrected? First, resorting to Greek experts living and working outside Greece may be reasonable since it is to
assume that they dispose of a deeper knowledge of the specific situation of their original home country than anyone
else. Nevertheless, it should not be presented as a move to solve the issue of legitimacy. In fact, the solution does
not become more legitimated only because those who should be vested with more competences – yet, on the basis
of EU resources – originally come from the country which is supposed to need more deep-going reforms. Secondly,
it should be outlined that the intervention has to bear no trait of intergovernmentalism, but be explicitly supranational.
Indeed – and here comes the third point – if the measures are described as supranational and decided on the basis
of supranational procedures, then the question of legitimacy finds a way to a possible solution. What is decided and
implemented, in fact, would take the shape of decisions and actions by EU citizens for the sake of EU citizens. Put it
in a simple way, it would mean that Greeks help themselves, and that they do it as EU citizens – along with all other
EU citizens and with their support. Fourthly, the highest attention should be stressed towards the social situation of
the country and, in particular, of those who have seen their living conditions becoming worse during the last years
and their perspective for the future – as well as for the future of their children – almost fading away in the dust of
despair.
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